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The Changing Legal Climate for Physician Aid
in Dying
While once widely rejected as a health care option,
physician aid in dying is receiving increased recogni-
tion as a response to the suffering of patients at the
end of life. With aid in dying, a physician writes a pre-
scription for life-ending medication for an eligible
patient. Following the recommendation of the Ameri-
can Public Health Association, the term aid in dying
rather than “assisted suicide” is used to describe the
practice.1 In this Viewpoint, we describe the changing
legal climate for physician aid in dying occurring in
several states (Table).
Voters inOregonandWashingtonhave legalizedaid
in dying by public referendum, legislators in Vermont
havedonesobystatutoryenactment,andcourts inMon-
tana and New Mexico have done so by judicial rulings.
Support for aid in dying is increasing, and it would not
be surprising to seevoters, legislators, or courts inother
states approve the practice. Indeed, in their 2014 ses-
sions, at least 6 state legislatures considered proposals
similar to the Vermont statute.
Althoughdifferent stateshaveauthorizedaid indy-
ing through different legal routes, they all have ex-
tended the right to the same class of patients—
mentally competent adults who are terminally ill. Even
though patients can suffer greatly from disease before
their final days, the 5 states have limited recognition of
aid in dying to patientswith an incurable condition that
will likely result in death within 6 months2 or within a
“relatively short time.”3
Thisconvergenceonarightonly for terminally illper-
sons to aid in dying is no coincidence. Indeed, it reflects
a long-standing progression in end-of-life law. Society
limits aid indying to terminally ill patients toensure that
the practice is available only for individuals whose con-
ditions might justify this option of last resort. The his-
tory of end-of-life law is instructive.
Atone time, itwasnot clearwhetherpatients could
hasten death by refusing life-sustaining medical treat-
ment. In the view ofmany people, turning off a ventila-
tor, stopping dialysis, or discontinuing artificial feeding
was an act of killing and should be unlawful. But begin-
ning in 1976 with the Quinlan case in New Jersey4 and
anadvancedirectivestatute inCalifornia,5courtsand leg-
islatures concluded that patients may reject their phy-
sicians’ treatment recommendations even when treat-
ment is necessary to prolong life.
Recognitionof theright to refuse life-sustainingcare
reflectedasocietal consensus thatpeopleshouldbeable
to decline treatment when they are suffering greatly
from irreversible and severe illness. In such cases, the
burdensofcontinuedtreatmentmayeasilyoutweighthe
benefits, and people should not be forced to endure a
prolongedandundignifieddyingprocess.6What is criti-
cal about the right is the desire to protect seriously ill
people from intolerable suffering.
How is it possible to decide when someone’s ill-
ness is serious enough that treatment can be refused?
TheQuinlan case concluded that the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment should exist when the patient’s
prognosis becomes very grim.4
However, this approach raises serious problems. If
judgesmustdecidewhenapatient is so sick that thepa-
tient can refuse life-sustaining treatment, then thegov-
ernment ends up deciding whomust live andwhomay
die based on judgments about a person’s quality of life.
This approachwouldpossibly lead to “deathpanels.”Ac-
cordingly, latercourtsconcludedthatde-
cisionswhether toacceptor refuse treat-
ment “mustultimatelybelong to theone
whose life is in issue.”7
Although it ispossible that someone
will refuse life-sustainingtreatment inthe
absenceofaseriousillness,thatrarelyhap-
pens.Moreover,whensuchrefusalsoccur,
they typically reflect important religious
beliefs, as when a Jehovah’s Witness re-
fusesabloodtransfusion. Inshort, it ispos-
sible toavoidhavingthegovernmentmakequality-of-life
decisions and still be confident that life-sustaining treat-
mentwillberefusedbypatientsonly insituations inwhich
that option iswarranted.
Although a right to refuse treatment did not go too
far in allowing death-causing actions, many people felt
it didnot go far enough. For instance, somepatients are
seriously ill and suffering greatly from widely meta-
static cancerorotheradvanceddiseases,butarenotde-
pendent on life-sustaining treatment. For those pa-
tients, aid in dying can be an important option.
However, there are real risks if patients are allowed
to receive a prescription for a lethal dose of medica-
tion. Not all patients who would ask for a prescription
would be suffering from an irreversible and severe ill-
ness. Somemight havebecome tiredof life, depressed,
or feel that that their life has insufficient meaning. Ac-
cordingly, a right toaid indyingcouldbe recognizedonly
By restricting aid in dying to competent
and terminally ill adults, the law can
ease the dying process for patients, and
their families, and avoid the potential
for the mistreatment of patients.
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with assurances that access would be limited to patients who are
truly seriously ill. In addition, as with the withdrawal of treatment,
the government could not impose limits by making quality-of-life
judgments.
The terminal illness requirementprovides the right kindof limit
for aid indying. It doesnot empower thegovernment tomakequal-
ity-of-life judgments, and it restricts thepractice topatientswhoare
suffering from irreversible and severe disease.8
This is not just a matter of theory. Oregon has had more than
15 years of experience with aid in dying limited to the terminally ill,
and the state’s experience has been reassuring. Aid in dying is
used rarely by dying patients—less than one-half of 1% of deaths
result from the practice (less than 100 patients annually). Approxi-
mately 80% of aid-in-dying patients are terminally ill from cancer,
and aid-in-dying patients are similar to other dying patients in
terms of sex, race, health insurance coverage, and hospice enroll-
ment. Moreover, aid-in-dying patients tend to have higher levels
of education than other dying patients.9 Vulnerable patients are
not succumbing to aid in dying. It is not surprising that once
Oregon’s experience with aid in dying was reassuring, other states
were willing to consider authorizing aid in dying.
Althoughmanycritics of aid indyinghavebeenconcerned that
legal recognition of the practice would result in a slippery slope to
abuse, those fears havenotmaterialized inOregon,Washington, or
the other states that have given formal recognition to aid in dying.
By restricting aid indying to competent and terminally ill adults, the
lawcanease thedyingprocess forpatients, and their families,10 and
avoid the potential for themistreatment of patients.
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Table. States Currently Legalizing Aid in Dying forMentally Competent, Terminally Ill Adults
State Year of Legalization Path of Recognition Eligibility Criteria Citation for Statute or Court Decision
Oregon 1994 and 1997 Public referenda Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults
Or Rev Stat §§127.800-127.897
Washington 2008 Public referendum Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults
Rev Code Wash § 70.245
Montana 2009 State supreme court
decision
Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults
Baxter v State of Montana, 224 P3d
1211 (Mont 2009)
Vermont 2013 Legislation Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults
18 Vt Stat §§5281-5292
New
Mexico
2014 State trial court
decision (subject to
reversal on appeal)
Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults
Morris v Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV
2012-02909 (Bernalillo County, NM,
January 13, 2014)
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